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a result previously obtained by Herbert Gintis. However, we find that the
stability of the competitive equilibrium depends on how individuals learn -
whether they are innovators (individual learners) or imitators (social learn-
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that this endogenous behavior, apart from the initial population of inno-
vators, is mainly determined by the agents’ intensity of choice. This study
grounds the Walrasian competitive equilibrium based on the view of a bal-
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achieved through a meta-learning model, is shown to be underpinned by a
behavioral/psychological characteristic.
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1 Introduction
Market economies are often seen as exhibiting a ‘remarkable degree of coher-
ence’ (Arrow, 1974) in terms of coordinating a highly dispersed multitude of
actions, performed by very many individuals. How does the economic system
achieve this coordination? Developments in the field of general equilibrium
theory over the last 140 years have shown the conditions under which such a
coherence may be plausible. However, coherence is interpreted in terms of an
equilibrium phenomenon in this class of models. The discovery of equilibrium
prices that balance the demands and supplies of various actors in the aggre-
gate, across all markets, is seen as being mediated through a fictional, central-
ized authority. This authority, known as the Walrasian auctioneer, supposedly
achieves this discovery through a process of trial and error (taˆtonnement).
In this framework, trading happens, if at all it happens, only in equilibrium.
Despite its advantages, taˆtonnement as a tool to find a solution needs to be
distinguished from both the plausibility and reality of the process of such
an interaction1. The taˆtonnement process is highly divorced from how agents
actually go about achieving coordination by searching and learning to discover
prices. Therefore, it becomes necessary to go beyond the taˆtonnement process
and find plausible descriptions of behavior that respect the limitations that
human agents face. 2
Attempts to weaken the assumption of a centralized auctioneer, allow-
ing for disequilibrium trading, has also been the theme of research on non-
taˆtonnement processes (Hahn and Negishi, 1962; Uzawa, 1960; Fisher, 1983)3.
To permit disequilibrium trading, however, means that there are many trading
protocols that are possible, and developing behaviorally plausible and accept-
able trading protocols becomes important. Given such a decentralized, dise-
quilibrium trading process, we can ask whether the economy will steer itself
toward the competitive general equilibrium.
To this end, viewing an economy as a decentralized, distributed computing
system to cope with the problem of coordinating the demand and supply of
various agents can be fruitful. In this framework, no one person has complete
knowledge of the entire system. However, agents interacting amongst them-
selves could collectively solve this dynamic problem of price discovery by trial
1 Velupillai (2015) succinctly summarizes the different facets of the problem, viz. the
‘existence of a solution, a method of finding it (if ‘proved’ to exist), the ‘reality’ of the
method considered as a dynamic process and its stability’ (Ibid, p. 1556).
2 This is expressed with admirable clarity in Clower (1975), p.13.
3 Several important contributions made in the 1970s and 1980s also took up the disequi-
librium and out-of-equilibrium dynamics to establish a link between Keynesian and general
equilibrium models. On this see, Benassy (1982); Malinvaud (1977).
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and error.4 Agent-based modeling provides a suitable framework to investi-
gate questions of such nature (Tesfatsion, 2006). Albin and Foley (1992) made
initial attempts to study decentralized interaction without an auctioneer and
more recently a few studies - Gintis (2006, 2007, 2013),Mandel (2012), Mandel
et al. (2015)- have advanced this approach by augmenting agents with learning
capabilities.
This latest development, referred to as Walrasian dynamics by Herbert
Gintis, distinguishes itself by showing how the non-taˆtonnement processes to
the general equilibrium may work even though the taˆtonnement processes fail.
For instance, Scarf (1960) demonstrated an important counterexample to the
stability of the Walrasian general equilibrium under the taˆtonnement process;
Gintis (2007), nonetheless, has shown that the Walrasian equilibrium as a
globally stable stationary state can ensue in the Scarf model by employing
agent-based simulations. Gintis (2013) further indicates that neither individ-
ual nor social learning alone can ensure price discovery. To converge to the
competitive equilibrium (CE), we need both.
. . . individual learning is insufficient to produce market equilibrium. The
imitation process is much more powerful than individual learning, but
the two in combination are quite powerful even in the case of many
goods. (Ibid, p. 123)
We consider the above quotation to be quite intriguing and deserving fur-
ther elaboration. First of all, individual learning (sometimes also recognized
as exploitation or innovation) and social learning (exploration or imitation)
are two different types of learning from experiences. It is interesting to see
whether these two learning schemes can result in different outcomes (Vriend,
2000). However, few studies have questioned the combined effect of the two
and their possible synergies. Second, while Gintis did notice the significance
of their combined use, he did not further distinguish different forms of such
combinations. He considers sequential combination, i.e., in two stages, where
agents sequentially apply social learning (imitation) and individual learning
(mutation). This form is rather familiar in evolutionary game theory (Samuel-
son, 1998). An alternative is a hierarchical combination. In this form, at each
point in time, each agent can either decide to innovate (individual learning)
or imitate (social learning), but not both. This latter form is frequently seen
in evolutionary computation (Koza, 1992), but was not studied by Gintis.
By and large, sequential combination is biologically motivated, which in-
terprets mutation as an ‘error’ added to the self-reproduction process of chro-
mosomes. Being an error, this kind of biological mutation normally leads to a
disaster. Therefore, when ‘blindly’ applied to social sciences, it does not help
answer the basic question: what motivates the agent to randomly change the
copied strategy (price)? The motivation is normally not part of the model.
On the other hand, hierarchical combination has no room for this ‘natural
4 At a systemic level, it has been shown that the computational complexity of a decentral-
ized system of interacting agents is lower than that of the centralized system that is based
on a Walrasian auctioneer (Axtell, 2005).
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mistake’: imitation and innovation are two separate choices. The motivation
behind this choice problem is a matter of personal preference and may depend
on the agent’s experience.
In this paper, we introduce a meta-learning approach for agents to decide
when to learn from others’ experiences (imitation or social learning) and when
to learn from his/her own experience (innovation or individual learning). The
meta-learning model is concretized by reinforcement learning. This formulation
is similar to the heuristic switching models popularly used in the agent-based
computational economics literature (Hommes, 2011; Anufriev and Hommes,
2012; Hommes & Zeppini, 2014). Needless to say, the value of our proposal does
not lie in this specific form of meta-learning; instead, it lies in its extendibility
to other equally plausible behavioral heuristics.
Through the meta-learning model, hierarchical combination not only allows
agents to endogenously determine whether to imitate or innovate, but also
endogenously generate the population size of imitators and innovators over
time. This degree of autonomy and heterogeneity helps us to gain insights
into the market mechanism in terms of constantly searching for a balance
between exploitation and exploration as a way of knowledge production and
distribution. This balance is not accomplished by a central planner in the sense
of the Walrasian auctioneer, but by a ‘man on the spot’ in the spirit of Hayek
(1945).
In this paper, we revisit Gintis’ Walrasian dynamics in an agent-based Scarf
economy by engaging in a systematic and thorough study of the combined use
of individual learning and social learning. We investigate the price dynamics
with different parameter values of the proposed meta-learning model. Like
Gintis, we apply the simplicity principle (Axelrod, 1997) and only consider
the simplest form of individual and social learning, namely, mutation and
imitation.
Our major findings can be summarized as follows. As in Gintis (2007, 2013),
we show that neither individual learning nor social learning alone can always
help agents coordinate their prices and lead the economy to the competitive
equilibrium. Moreover, we also show that an economy composed of an exoge-
nously fixed fraction of imitators and innovators, without switching between
the two groups, is also insufficient to ensure price coordination. However, if
we allow agents to decide when to imitate and innovate through reinforce-
ment meta-learning, then the economy can reach its equilibrium configuration
when a parameter known as the intensity of choice is properly set. In fact, this
parameter endogenously determines the fraction of innovators and imitators,
the fraction of mobile (switching) agents, and the resources allocated between
exploration (being analogous to social learning) and exploitation (being anal-
ogous to individual learning), which in turn determines the price deviation
away from the competitive equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
Scarf economy and presents an agent-based version of the same along with
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the bilateral trading protocols.5 Section 3 presents the learning mechanisms
used by the agents in this economy. Section 4 outlines the simulation design
followed by a presentation of the simulation results in Section 5 and concluding
remarks in Section 6.
2 The Scarf Economy and the Non-Taˆtonnement Process
Scarf (1960) showed that an economy may not always converge to the Wal-
rasian general equilibrium under the taˆtonnement process, even when the equi-
librium is unique. This raises concerns about the stability of the general equi-
librium. In an attempt to provide a dynamic and evolutionary foundation for a
general equilibrium, Gintis (2007) used an agent-based model to demonstrate
that when agents hold subjective expectations on prices (referred to as private
prices)6 and imitate other agents who have been successful, prices converge
to the unique general equilibrium of the Scarf-like economy. As in Gintis, we
start with the Scarf economy because of its structure that is readily amenable
to investigation and the popularity that it has enjoyed.
2.1 An Agent-Based Model of the Scarf Economy
Following Scarf (1960), we consider a pure exchange economy composed of N
agents. This economy has three goods, denoted by j = 1, 2, 3, and correspond-
ingly, N agents are grouped in to three different ‘types’, τj , j = 1, 2, 3, where
τ1 ≡ {1, . . . , N1}; τ2 ≡ {N1 + 1, . . . , N1 +N2}; τ3 ≡ {N1 +N2, . . . , N}. Agents
who belong to τj (type-j) are initially endowed with wj units of good j, and
zero unit of the other two goods. Let Wi be the endowment vector of agent i:
Wi =
 (w1, 0, 0), i ∈ τ1,(0, w2, 0), i ∈ τ2,
(0, 0, w3), i ∈ τ3.
(1)
All agents are assumed to have a Leontief type payoff function.
Ui(x1, x2, x3) =

min{ x2w2 , x3w3 }, i ∈ τ1,
min{ x1w1 , x3w3 }, i ∈ τ2,
min{ x1w1 , x2w2 }, i ∈ τ3.
(2)
5 In order to examine the role played by learning, we choose a version that is closer to
Scarf’s original version and augment it with learning. It is therefore different from Gintis
(2007) , which has production.
6 As Gintis (2013, p.119) notes:
...This is the fact that in a decentralized market economy out of equilibrium, there is
no price vector for the economy at all. The assumption that there is a system of prices
that are common knowledge to all participants (we may call these public prices) is
reasonable in equilibrium, because all agents can, at least in principle, observe the
same prices. However, out of equilibrium there is no single set of prices determined
by market exchange. Rather, every agent has a subjective prior concerning prices,
based on personal experience, that he uses to make and carry out trading plans.
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Given the complementarity feature of this payoff function, we populate an
equal number of agents in each type. This ensures that the economy is balanced
and that no free goods appear.
We assume that agents have their own subjective expectations of the prices
of different goods,
Pei (t) = (P
e
i,1(t), P
e
i,2(t), P
e
i,3(t)), i = 1, ..., N. (3)
where P ei,j(t) is agent i’s price expectation of good j at time t.
7
Given a vector of the subjective prices (private prices), the optimal demand
vector, X∗ = Ψ∗(W) can be derived by maximizing payoffs with respect to
the budget constraint.
X∗i = (x
∗
i,1, x
∗
i,2, x
∗
i,3) =
 (0, ψ
∗
iw2, ψ
∗
iw3), i ∈ τ1,
(ψ∗iw1, 0, ψ
∗
iw3), i ∈ τ2,
(ψ∗iw1, ψ
∗
iw2, 0), i ∈ τ3.
(4)
where the multiplier
ψ∗i =

(P ei,1w1)/(
∑
j=2,3 P
e
i,jwj), i ∈ τ1,
(P ei,2w2)/(
∑
j=1,3 P
e
i,jwj), i ∈ τ2,
(P ei,3w3)/(
∑
j=1,2 P
e
i,jwj), i ∈ τ3.
(5)
Note that the prices in the budget constraint are ‘private’ prices. Rather
than restricting the prices within a certain neighborhood (for instance a unit
sphere in Scarf (1960)), we follow Anderson et al. (2004) and set one of the
prices (P3) as the nume´raire. The Walrasian competitive equilibrium for this
system is P ∗1 = P
∗
2 = P
∗
3 = 1, when the endowments for each type are equal
and symmetric. However, in this model agents may have own price expecta-
tions that may be very different from this competitive equilibrium price, and
base their consumption decision on their private price expectations P ei,j . To
facilitate exchange, we match agents in the model randomly with each other
and they are allowed to trade amongst each other if they find it to be benefi-
cial. For this, we need to specify a precise bilateral trading protocol and the
procedures concerning how agents dynamically revise their subjective prices.
2.2 Trading protocol
We randomly match a pair of agents, say, i and i′. Let i be the proposer,
and i′ be the responder. Agent i will initiate the trade and set the price, and
agent i′ can accept or decline the offer. We check for the double coincidence
of wants, i.e., whether they belong to the same type. If they do, they will be
rematched; otherwise, we check whether the agents have a positive amount of
endowment in order for them to engage in trade. Let mi be the commodity
7 More specifically, t refers to the whole market day t, i.e., the interval [t, t− 1).
Agent-Based Modeling of a Non-Taˆtonnement Process 7
that i is endowed with (mi = 1, 2, 3). Agent i, based on his subjective price
expectations, proposes an exchange to agent i′,
x∗i,m′i =
P ei,mixi′,mi
P ei,mi′
. (6)
Here, the proposer (i) makes an offer to satisfy the need of the agent i′ up to
xi′,mi in exchange for his own need x
∗
i,mi′
.
Agent i′ will evaluate the ‘fairness’ of the proposal using his private, sub-
jective expectations and will consider the proposal interesting provided that
P ei′,mixi′,mi ≥ P ei′,mi′x∗i,mi′ ; (7)
Otherwise, he will decline the offer. Since the offer is in a form of take-it-or-
leave-it (no bargaining), this will mark the end of trade.
Agent i′ will accept the proposal if the above inequality (7) is satisfied,
and if xi′,mi ≤ x∗i′,mi . This saturation condition ensures that he has enough
goods to trade with i and meet his demand. However, if only the saturation
condition is not satisfied, the proposal will still be accepted, but the trading
volume will be adjusted downward to xi,mi′ < x
∗
i,mi′
. Agents update their
(individual) excess demand and as long as they have goods to sell, they can
continue to trade with other agents. The agents are rematched many times
to ensure that the opportunities to trade are exhausted. Once the bilateral
exchange is completed, the economy enters into the consumption stage and
the payoff of each agent Ui(Xi(t)), i = 1, 2, ..., N, is determined. Note that
Xi(t), the realized amount after the trading process may not be the same
as the planned level X∗i (t). This may be due to misperceived private prices
and a sequence of ‘bad luck’, such as running out of search time (number of
trials) before making a deal, etc. Based on the difference between Xi(t) and
X∗i (t), each agent i in our model will adaptively revise his or her private prices
through a process of learning.
3 Learning
In this section, we shall follow Gintis (2007) and consider only the simplest
form of individual learning and social learning, since our focus is on the pro-
posed hierarchical combination of individual and social learning. We are in-
terested in knowing the price discovery capability when only one scheme of
learning is applied, to be compared with the case when both are used. In
this article, we do not consider more deliberated, complex forms of individ-
ual learning, such as simulated annealing, artificial neural networks, decision
tress, fuzzy inference, and social learning, such as genetic algorithms and ge-
netic programming.8. They are certainly important branches to consider along
the expansion of this research agenda, but to avoid unnecessary complications
8 For a more extended list, see Chen, Kao and Ragupathy (2016)
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they are not considered at this stage. In fact, the simplicity principle prompts
us to wonder: if one can obtain a well-performing result by combining two sim-
ple learning rules, then why bother using more complex ones? Consequently,
for the simplest form of individual learning, we consider just mutation, symbol-
izing innovation (Brenner, 1998), and, for social learning, we simply consider
imitation (Rendell et al., 2010).
3.1 Individual Learning
We begin with the mutation-like individual learning. Mutation can be under-
stood as a perturbation to the incumbent strategy; in our case, this applies to
the behavior of price expectations, Pei (t) (see also Equation (3)). It has the
following canonical form:
Pei (t + 1) = P
e
i (t) + ∆Pi, i = 1, 2, ..., N. (8)
For the perturbation term ∆Pi, the mechanism that we employ can be thought
of as a modified agent-level version of the Walrasian price adjustment equation.
Let the optimal and actual consumption bundles be denoted by the vectors
X∗i (t) and Xi(t), respectively. Agent i can check his excess supply and excess
demand by comparing these two vectors component-wise. Agents then reflect
on how well their strategy (private price expectations) has performed in the
previous trading round and adjust their strategies based on their own experi-
ence of excess demand and supply. We employ a gradient descent approach to
characterize individual learning and, in a generic form, it can be written as:
Pei (t + 1) = P
e
i (t) + ∆Pi(Xi(t),X
∗
i (t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradient descent
, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (9)
and we shall detail its specific operation as follows.
Let myi and m
c
i denote the production set and consumption set of agent i.
In the Scarf economy, myi ∩mci = ∅ and in this specific 3-good scarf economy,
myi = {mi}. At the end of each market period, agent i will review his expec-
tations for all commodities, P ei,j(t),∀j. For the good that the agent ‘produces’
(or is endowed with), the price expectations P ei,j(t) will be adjusted downward
if mi is not completely sold out (i.e., when there is excess supply). Nonetheless,
even if mi has been completely sold out, it does not mean that the original
price expectation will be sustained. In fact, under these circumstances, there
is still a probability that P ei,j(t) may be adjusted upward. This is to allow agent
i to explore or experiment regarding whether his produced (endowed) com-
modity might deserve a better price. However, to ensure that our agents do
not over-react despite having zero-inventory, we assume that their tendency
to change prices will decline with the passage of time. That is to say, when
agents constantly learn from their experiences, they gradually gain confidence
in their zero-inventory price expectations. Specifically, the time-decay function
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applied in our model is exponential, which means that this kind of exploita-
tion disappears quickly with time. For those goods in the vector Xi that are
a part of the consumption set of the agent, i.e., j ∈mci , the mechanism would
operate exactly in the opposite manner by increasing the price expectations
if there were excess demand. The individual learning protocol is summarized
below.
Protocol: Individual Learning
1. At the end of the trading day, agent i examines the extent to which his
planned demand has been satisfied. Let
∆xi,j(t) =
{
x∗i,j(t)− xi,j(t), if j ∈mci ,
0− xi,j(t), if j ∈myi
(10)
2. The subjective prices P ei,j of all three goods will be adjusted depending on
the absolute value | ∆xi,j(t) |.
3. If | ∆xi,j(t) |> 0 (i.e., | ∆xi,j(t) |6= 0),
P ei,j(t+ 1) =
{
(1 + α(| ∆xi,j(t) |))P ei,j(t), if j ∈mci .
(1− α(| ∆xi,j(t) |))P ei,j(t), if j ∈myi .
(11)
where α(.) is a hyperbolic tangent function, given by:
α(| ∆xi,j(t) |) = tanh(ϕ | ∆xi,j(t) |) = e
(ϕ|∆xi,j(t)|) − e(−ϕ|∆xi,j(t)|)
e(ϕ|∆xi,j(t)|) + e(−ϕ|∆xi,j(t)|)
(12)
4. If | ∆xi,j(t) |= 0,
P ei,j(t+ 1) =
{
(1− β(t))P ei,j(t), if j ∈mci .
(1 + β(t))P ei,j(t), if j ∈myi .
(13)
where β is a random variable, and is a function of time.
β = θ1 exp
−t
θ2
, θ1 ∼ U [0, 0.1], (14)
where U [0, 0.1] is the uniform distribution between 0 and 0.1, and θ2 is a
time scaling constant.
3.2 Social Learning
The second scheme of learning available to the agent is social learning. This
process of acquiring relevant information from other members can be deci-
sive for effective adaptation and evolutionary survival. Consequently, social
learning has been a prominent feature in the evolutionary models in biology,
economics and game theory (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993; Apesteguia et al.,
2007). Imitation is one of the most commonly invoked, simplest forms of social
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learning. Players imitate for a variety of reasons and the advantages can be in
the form of lower information-gathering costs and information processing costs,
and imitation also may act as a coordination device in games (Alo´s-Ferrer &
Schlag, 2009).
In this paper, we adopt a fairly basic version of imitation behavior, where
agents exchange their experiences regarding payoffs with other agents with
whom they are randomly matched. An agent with a lower payoff can, on
observing others, replace his own expectations with those of the agent with a
higher payoff. If the agent ends up meeting someone who has performed worse
than him, he does not imitate and retains his original price expectations. We
present the social learning protocol below.
Protocol: Social Learning
1. At the end of each day, each agent consumes the bundle of goods that
he has obtained after trading, and derives pleasure from his consumption
Ui(t) (i = 1, .., N).
2. Agents are matched randomly, either with other agents of the same type
or with agents who are of different types. This is achieved by randomly
picking up a pair of agents (i, i′) without replacement and they are given a
chance to interact.
3. Their payoffs are ranked, and the price expectations are modified as follows:
Pei (t+ 1) =
P
e
i′(t), if Ui(t) < Ui′(t),
Pei (t), if Ui(t) > Ui′(t),
Random(Pei (t),P
e
i′(t)), if Ui(t) = Ui′(t).
(15)
The protocol makes it possible for agents to meet locally and enables them
to exchange information. An agent who has performed well can influence some-
one who hasn’t performed as well by modifying their perception of the econ-
omy.
3.3 Meta Learning
The novelty of the paper is that we propose a meta-learning model (a stochastic
choice framework) to hierarchically integrate individual and social learning
schemes. In the literature, the only study which can be related to our approach
is Bossan, Jann, and Hammerstein (2015). However, in their model, meta-
learning is not applied to individuals but to the whole population; in other
words, they used a mesoscopic approach to determine the proportion (market
fraction) of ‘individual learners’ and ‘social learners’, an approach similar to
the replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory. We, on the other hand,
used a truly microscopic approach to leave each individual agent to choose
one of the two learning schemes.9 In our model, each agent can consciously
9 It is known that these two approaches can generally lead to different results (Grimm
and Railsback, 2005). We, however, will leave this issue to a separate study.
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choose between social learning and individual learning on each market day
based on the past performance of these schemes. We formulate this choice
between different learning schemes as a two-armed bandit problem.
3.3.1 Two-Armed Bandit Problem
In our market environment, the agent repeatedly chooses between two learning
schemes, individual learning and social learning. Denote the action space (fea-
sible set of choice) by Γ , Γ = {ail, asl}, where ail and asl refer to the action
of individual learning and social learning, respectively. Each action chosen at
time t by agent i yields a payoff pi(ak,t)(k = il, sl). This payoff is uncertain,
but the agent can observe this payoff ex-post and this information is used
to guide future choices. This setting is analogous to the familiar two-armed
bandit problem. In the literature, reinforcement learning has been taken as a
standard behavioral model for this type of choice problem (Arthur, 1993). In
this paper, we shall follow this tradition. Our reinforcement learning model is
to be introduced in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.2 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning has been widely investigated both in artificial intelli-
gence (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Wiering & van Otterlo, 2012) and economics
(Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998). The intuition behind this learning
scheme is that better performing choices are reinforced over time and those
that lead to unfavorable or negative outcomes are not. In our model, each
agent reinforces only two choices, i.e., individual learning and social learning
(Γ = {ail, asl}). In terms of reinforcement learning, the probability of a scheme
being chosen depends on the (normalized) propensity accumulated over time.
Specifically, the mapping between the propensity and the choice probability is
represented by the following Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution:
Probi,k(t+ 1) =
eλ·qi,k(t)
eλ·qi,ail (t) + eλ·qi,asl (t)
, k ∈ {ail, asl}, (16)
where Probi,k(t) is the choice probability for learning scheme k (k = ail, asl);
we index this choice probability by i (the agent) and t (time) considering
that different agents may have different experiences with respect to the same
learning scheme, and that, even for the same agent, experience may vary with
time. The notation qi,k(t) (k = ail, asl) denotes the propensity of the learning
scheme k for agent i at time t. Again, it is indexed by t because the propensity
is revised from time to time based on the accumulated payoff.
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The propensity updating scheme applied here is the one-parameter version
of Roth and Erev (1995).10
qi,k(t+ 1) =
{
(1− φ)qi,k(t) + Ui(t), if k is chosen,
(1− φ)qi,k(t), otherwise, (17)
where Ui(t) ≡ Ui(Xi(t)), k ∈ {ail, asl}, and φ is the so-called recency param-
eter, which can be interpreted as a memory-decaying factor.11 The notation λ
denotes the intensity of choice. With higher λs, the agent’s choice is less ran-
dom and is heavily biased toward the better performing behavioral strategy; in
other words, the degree of exploration in which the agent engages is reduced.
In the limit as λ→∞, the agent’s choice degenerates to the greedy algorithm
which is only interested in the “optimal choice” that is conditional on the most
recent updated experience; in this case, the agent no longer explores.
3.3.3 Reference Points
We further augment the standard reinforcement learning model with a reference-
point mechanism to decide when Equation (16) will be triggered. Reference
dependence in decision making has been made popular by prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), where gains and losses are defined relative to
a reference point. This draws attention to the notion of position concerning
the stimuli and the role it plays in cognitive coding that describes the agent’s
perception of the stimuli.
The meta-learning behavior described by Equation (16) alone essentially
assumes that agents examine their learning scheme in each period t, with the
same frequency that they examine their price expectations. With the aug-
mented version of the meta-learning model, agents are assumed to question
the appropriateness of their ‘incumbent’ learning scheme only when their pay-
offs fall short of the reference point (along the lines of Erev and Rapoport
(1998), p.152-153). Let Ui(t)(≡ Ui(Xi(t))) be the payoff of an agent i at time
t. Let his reference point at time t be Ri(t). The agent will consider a scheme
switch only when his realized payoff Ui(t) is lower than his reference point
Ri(t). In this narrow sense, our agents can be considered to be Simonian sat-
isficing agents: they would consider switching the learning scheme only when
they are not satisfied (Ui(t) < Ri(t)); otherwise, they will stick to their current
learning scheme.
10 We certainly can consider more generalized propensity updating dynamics with three
parameters as proposed by Camerer and Ho (1999), but that can complicate our analysis
at this initial stage. Hence, we plan to start with this ‘minimal’ model.
11 By following Arthur (1993), a normalization scheme is also applied to normalize the
propensities qi,k(t+ 1) as follows:
qi,k(t+ 1)←
qi,k(t+ 1)
qi,ail (t+ 1) + qi,asl (t+ 1)
. (18)
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The reference points indexed by t, Ri(t), imply that they need not be
static or exogenously given; instead they can endogenously evolve over time
with the experiences of the agents. Based on the current period payoffs, the
reference point can be revised up or down. This revision can be symmetric,
for example, a simple average of the current period payoffs and the reference
point. A richer case as shown in Equation (19) indicates that this revision can
be asymmetric; in Equation (19), downward revisions are more pronounced
than upward revisions.
Ri(t+ 1) =
{
Ri(t) + α
+ (Ui(t)−Ri(t)), if Ui(t) ≥ Ri(t) ≥ 0,
Ri(t)− α− (Ri(t)− Ui(t)), if Ri(t) > Ui(t) ≥ 0. (19)
In the above equation, α− and α+ are revision parameters and α−, α+ ∈
[0, 1]. The case with α− > α+ would indicate that the agents are more sensitive
to negative payoff deviations from their reference points.12. For the rest of the
simulations in this paper, we have utilized the asymmetric revision case.
4 Simulation Design
4.1 A Summary of the Model
4.1.1 Scale Parameters
Table 1 is a summary of the agent-based Scarf model which we describe in
Sections 2 and 3. It also provides the values of the control parameters used in
the rest of this paper. The Walrasian dynamics of the Scarf economy run in
this model has the following fixed scale: a total of 270 agents (N = 270), three
goods (M = 3), and hence 90 agents for each type of agent, N1 = N2 = N3 =
90. The initial endowment for each agent is 10 units (wi = 10), which also
serves as the Leontief coefficient for the utility function. With this setting, it
is easy to figure out that the competitive equilibrium price will be
P ∗1 = P
∗
2 = P
∗
3 = 1. (20)
Our simulation routine proceeds along the following sequence for each market
day (period): production process (endowment replenishment), demand gener-
ation, trading, consumption and payoff realization, learning and expectations
updating, propensity and reference point updating, and learning scheme up-
dating. Each market day is composed of 10,000 random matches (S = 10, 000),
to ensure that the number of matches is large enough to exhaust the possibil-
ities of trade. At the beginning of each market day, inventories perish (δ = 1)
and the agents will receive fresh endowments (10 units). Each single run of
the simulation will last for 2,500 days (T = 2, 500) and each simulation series
12 Results do not vary qualitatively for perturbations of these parameters.
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Table 1: Tableau of Control Parameters
Parameter Description Value/Range
N Number of agents 270
M Number of types 3
N1, N2, N3 Numbers of agents per type (4, 5) 90, 90, 90
wi (i = 1, 2, 3) Endowment (1) 10 units
Leontief coefficients (2) 10
δ Discount rate (Perishing rate) 1
S Number of matches (one market day) 10,000
T Number of market days 2,500
P ei (0) (i = 1, 2, 3) Initial price expectations (3) ∼ Uniform[0.5, 1.5]
ϕ Parameter of price adjustment (12) 0.002
θ1 Parameter of price adjustment (14) ∼ Uniform[0,0.1]
θ2 Parameter of price adjustment (14) 1
K Number of arms (Section 3.3.1) 2
λ Intensity of choice (16) [0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 10]
POPail (0) Initial population of ail 1/2
POPasl (0) Initial population of asl 1/2
φ Recency effect (17) 0
α+ Degree of upward revision (19) 0.1
α− Degree of downward revision (19) 0.2
The numbers inside the parentheses in the second column refer to the number of the equation
in which the respective parameter lies.
(to be discussed in Section 5.1) is repeated 50 times.13 These scale parameters
will be used throughout all simulations in Section 5.
4.1.2 Behavioral Parameters
The second part of the control parameters is related to the behavioral settings
of the model, and begins with initial price expectations and price expectation
adjustment, followed by the parameters related to the meta-learning models.
As noted earlier, we set good 3 as a nume´raire good, whose price is fixed as
one. Most of these parameters are held constant throughout all simulations, as
indicated in Table 1. Some, however, become the interest of the study. Their
values are either specified in Table 1, such as intensity of choice (λ), or will
be detailed in the sections in which they are involved, which include the prior
distribution of price expectations, P ei (0) (Simulation 1B, Section 5.2), as well
as the initial population of individual-learning agents, POPail(0) (Simulation
5, Section 5.6).
We could systematically vary the values of different parameters. The focus
of this paper is on the intensity of choice (λ) (Table 1). The initial price vector,
Pei (0), for each agent is randomly generated where the prices lie within the
range [0.5,1.5], i.e., having the Walrasian equilibrium price as the center. Ex-
13 We have examined the system by simulating the same treatments for much longer periods
and we find that the results are robust to this extended horizon.
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cept in the cases involving experimental variations of initial conditions, agents’
learning schemes, namely, individual learning (innovation) and social learn-
ing (imitation) are initially uniformly distributed (POPail(0) = POPasl(0) =
1/2). The details regarding the implementation of the simulations are provided
in Appendix A.
5 Simulation Results
5.1 A Summary of the Simulations
This paper is composed of the following five simulation series, each with a
given purpose, and they together address the contribution of meta-learning to
the market mechanism. We begin with the qualitative replications of Gintis’
results, which is to show that neither individual learning nor social learning
alone is sufficient for coordinating the economy toward the Walrasian equilib-
rium (Section 5.2). We demonstrate these ‘market failures’ through Simulation
1A (Section 5.2.1) and Simulation 1B (Section 5.2.2). We also show that the
observed deviation pattern is different. As for individual learning, we cannot
find the domain of attraction to the competitive equilibrium (CE) or to any
limit price; instead, the simulation is filled with ‘vicious cycles’ and price spi-
rals. For social learning, it always converges to a limit price depending on the
initial price distribution, while not necessarily to the CE.
If neither individual learning nor social learning alone can ensure price dis-
covery, then would the combined use of them make anything different and, if
so, why? This is the main question pursued by the following simulation se-
ries. However, to gain a basic insight into the information spread when social
learning is replaced with meta-learning, Simulation Series 2 is designed with a
different proportion of general-equilibrium agents (Section 5.3). Here, we find
that ‘rational expectations’ (the expectations of general-equilibrium agents)
cannot fully spread out to the whole economy and how well it can spread
depends on the initial population of the general-equilibrium agents. The en-
dogenously formed blocks which prevent information spread will be further
addressed in the following simulation.
The meta-learning model with different intensities of choice is studied in
Simulation Series 3; there we find a discernible relation between price con-
vergence and intensity of choice (Section 5.4). We find that the convergence
result is also correlated with the endogenously-generated market fraction. Mo-
tivated by the observed correlation between price deviation (convergence) and
market fraction, our subsequent simulation series attempts to understand the
possible causal mechanism between intensity of choice and price deviation.
In this regard, Simulation Series 4 treats market fraction as an exogenously
given variable and examines whether it alone can be a sufficient causal factor
for price convergence, termed as the market fraction hypothesis (Section 5.5),
whereas the Simulation Series 5 takes market fraction as endogenously formed
and studies its path-dependent property (Section 5.6).
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Simulation Series 4 is then an auxiliary simulation attempting to see whether
the significance of the market fraction can be exogenized, by directly impos-
ing a fixed proportion of innovators, who follow only the individual learning
scheme, and imitators, who follow only the social learning scheme (Section
5.5). The general failure to have price convergence to the CE with an exoge-
nous treatment of the market fraction compels us to continuously focus on
the endogenously formed market fraction in Simulation Series 5 (Section 5.6).
We find the existence of a path-dependence of the market fraction, and this
property is also dependent on λ.
To further understand the relationship among the intensity of choice, mar-
ket fraction and price deviation, we first examine the endogenously formed
market fraction from the viewpoint of resource allocation in terms of a balance
between exploitation (individual learning) and exploration (social learning).
We ask whether the resulting market fraction can be economically justified.
To do so, we check payoff equality between imitators (social learning) and
innovators (individual learning) (Section 5.7). Interestingly, payoff inequality
between these two types of agents exists and is both extensive and persistent;
obviously, the market fraction fails to adjust itself to narrow the payoff inequal-
ity gap. This provides evidence for the misallocation between exploitation and
exploration, which, to some extent, explains the observed price deviation.
To further trace why such an ill-structured market fraction could emerge,
we find that the mobility of agents in the sense of their switching between
imitators and innovators is key, which, not surprisingly, is determined by the
intensity of choice (Section 5.8). The journey along this series of investigations
allows us to conclude that the market mechanism can be regarded as a joint
force of exploitation and exploration. Each strategy by itself suffers a degree
of imperfection, which we can refer to as a ‘type-I error’ and ‘type-II error’.
Using payoff data to innovators and imitators, we can see how exploration can
aid the performance of exploitation, which may in turn aid the price discovery
capability of the entire market economy (Appendix C).
5.2 Simulation 1: Individual Learning and Social Learning Alone
In order to understand the role of learning, we first examine whether an econ-
omy composed of innovators (ail) or imitators (asl) alone can ensure that the
agents achieve price coordination.
5.2.1 Simulation 1A: Economy with Individual Learning (Innovators) Only
Simulation 1A studies the effect of individual learning only, which corresponds
to Table 1 on the parameter setting that POPasl(t) = 100%,∀t. The key result
is shown in Figure 1, where we can see that the prices of both commodities 1
and 2 keep on deviating away from the competitive equilibrium prices, which
are all one (20). This diverging (flying-away) pattern is quite consistent with
respect to different initial conditions, and can be understood as follows.
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Fig. 1: Price Dynamics with Individual Learning
Agents do not succeed in coordinating to equilibrium prices when all agents are innovators.
The prices reported are mean prices over 50 repetitions.
In this economy, based on the gradient-descent algorithm (Equations 9 and
11), agents with unsatisfied demand will upwardly adjust the price expecta-
tions of consumption goods and downwardly adjust the price expectations of
production goods. However, agents holding the nume´raire goods can only up-
wardly adjust the price expectations of consumption goods, since the price of
the nume´raire goods is fixed. Either adjustment will scale down the budget
constraint and reduce the demand for the consumption goods. This individ-
ual contraction, as a group, can cause a mild or serious deficiency in demand,
which may further lead to the excessive supply of other agents, even though the
matching rate can be improved with adjusted expectations. These agents with
excess supply have to downwardly adjust the price expectations of produc-
tion goods and upwardly adjust the price expectations of consumption goods
(Equation 11). This reinforcement can trigger a contraction cycle, which causes
the prices in terms of the nume´raire to spiral up, as shown in Figure 1.
The nume´raire plays a non-trivial role in influencing convergence in our
model by introducing a behavioral rigidity given that the price of this com-
modity cannot be altered14. The reason that we can have only explosive price
dynamics is because all commodities receive more upward-adjustment poten-
tial than downward-adjustment potential (2/3 vs. 1/3 of the market partici-
pants), except for commodity 3, which serves as a nume´raire. In this manner,
there is a net pulling force for the prices of commodities 1 and 2 to spiral up.
However, corresponding to Equation (11), there is an reverse process ongoing
as well (Equation (13), in general satisfying Equation (13), which is harder
than satisfying Equation (11). The set of | ∆xi,j(t) |> 0 is much denser than
14 Nume´raire normalized processes and their convergence properties have been studied
widely in the tatoˆnnement literature. We do not analyze the non-normalized case in this pa-
per. See Kitti (2010), for example, on non-normalized iterative processes and the associated
convergence conditions.
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Fig. 2: Price Dynamics with Social Learning
The figures show the simulation results of Simulation 1B-1 (the upper left panel) and 1B-2
(the upper right panel). The initial distribution of priors in Simulation 1B-1 is U [0.5, 1.5],
whereas in Simulation 1B-2 it is U [0, 5]. The prices reported are mean prices over 50 repeti-
tions. To have a better vision of the transition dynamics, an expanded version of the early
periods of 1B-1 and 1B-2 are shown in the lower left and lower right panels, respectively.
the set of | ∆xi,j(t) |= 0 ; hence we rarely see the divergence developing in a
downward manner.15
5.2.2 Simulation 1B: Economy with Social Learning (Imitators) Only
In the next series of simulations, Simulation 1B, we consider the case where all
agents are equipped with the social learning scheme only, i.e., throughout the
entire simulation, they can only learn from others’ experiences as described in
the protocol given in Section 3.2. This corresponds to Table 1 on the parameter
setting that POPasl(t) = 100%,∀t. As we shall show in this section, for an
economy with only imitators, the results are more subtle. In this case, agents
can always coordinate themselves well. However, the limit prices depend on the
initial distribution of price expectations P ei,j(0), (j = 1, 2, 3). Notice that these
expectations are initially randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. From
Table 1, we know that the range of the initial price distribution is P ∗j (= 1)±0.5.
With this range, Figure 2, the top left panel at first glance may seem to show
that social learning can drive the market to rapidly converge quite close to the
Walrasian competitive equilibrium prices.
15 This property can also been found in Table 2, the results of Simulation Series 3, where
we can see that for each type of agent the price expectations of own consumption goods
are biased upward, whereas the price expectations of own production goods are biased
downward.
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However, to see the robustness of this convergence result, we consider a
different set of initial price expectations in which the range is not only wider
but the centroid is also biased upward from the Walrasian competitive equi-
librium price. In other words, we test the price coordination capability when
agents’ priors are not only more heterogeneous but also more biased. This se-
ries of experiments, coded 1B-2, is to be distinguished from the former 1B-1.
In Simulation 1B-2, the uniform distribution is set to the interval [0, 5] (with
a centroid of 2.5 > 1 = P ∗j ). The result is demonstrated in parallel in the
right panel of Figure 2. What we find here is that even though the market can
coordinate an ‘equilibrium price, the discovered equilibrium was built upon
‘wrong’ expectations (a Pareto inferior equilibrium). It is also interesting to
notice that with this alternative initial distribution the market began with
upward biased expectations, i.e., a centroid of 2.5, but it can self-correct this
biasedness by bringing it down to a level of 1.3, although the trap to 1.3 shows
that this self-correction mechanism is incomplete.
5.2.3 Concluding Remarks of Simulation Series 1
From Simulation Series 1, we can make the following remarks regarding our
basic understanding of the role of learning in the agent-based Scarf economy.
Remark 1 Individual learning (innovation) or social learning (imitation) alone
cannot ensure price coordination to the Walrasian competitive equilibrium in
the agent-based Scarf economy. In an all-innovator economy, the breakdown of
coordination from an out of equilibrium configuration is independent of the ini-
tial distribution of price expectations. For all-imitator economies, the success
of coordination is crucially dependent on the initial distribution.
These findings are in line with the previous literature (Gintis, 2007) that
innovation (trial and error learning) and imitation are both necessary to help
achieve coordination in a decentralized set-up. Given this, in Section 5.4 we
shall examine whether a combination of individual learning (innovation) and
social learning (imitation) can lead to price coordination in the presence of
a meta-learning model specified in Section 3.3. The meta-learning model in-
troduces agents who can switch in between the individual learning scheme
(exploitation) and the social learning scheme (exploration). However, before
we examine the impact of meta-learning agents on price coordination, we shall
first look at the situation where some agents behave as ‘general-equilibrium’
agents.
5.3 Simulation 2: Introduction of ‘General-Equilibrium’ Agents
In economies with only imitators, we saw that the competitive equilibrium
prices or those close to them would be eventually adopted by all agents. How-
ever, in the meta-learning model, agents could choose not to imitate others if
they don’t want to. This introduces a problem of the spread of socially desirable
20 Shu-Heng Chen et al.
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Fig. 3: Price Dynamics with General-Equilibirum Agents
λ indicates the level of intensity of choice and PRE indicates the percentage of general-
equilibrium agents. The upper block shows the effect of increasing the general-equilibrium
agents from 10% (left panel), 50% (middle panel) to 90% (right panel) for a lower intensity
of choice (λ = 1) and the lower block shows the same effect under a higher intensity of
choice (λ = 5).
expectations. The purpose of Simulation 2 is to evaluate the possible impact
of information spread when social learning is replaced with meta-learning. To
make the evaluation, we introduce the general-equilibrium agents, who take
the equilibrium prices as their private prices, remain stubborn and do not al-
ter them in the course of the market dynamics. These agents can be viewed as
being the rational-expectations agents, ‘fundamentalists’ or informed traders.
Simulation 2 will examine whether the presence of general-equilibrium agents
can drive all agents to adopt competitive equilibrium prices as their private
prices.
The key control parameter in Simulation 2 is the percentage of the general-
equilibrium agents in the economy, denoted by POPRE , or briefly, PRE , where
‘RE’ stands for rational expectations. We vary the percentage of general-
equilibrium agents from low (PRE = 10%), medium (50%), to high (90%)
values. These general-equilibrium agents are distributed equally across all dif-
ferent types of agents. In addition to PRE , we also vary the intensity of choice
(λ) from low (λ = 1) to high (λ = 5) so that the effect of general-equilibrium
agents can be studied in light of different meta-learning behavior. λ itself is an
important parameter in agent-based computational economics (Chen, Chang
and Du, 2012), and we shall study its role alone more thoroughly in Section
5.4.
Agent-Based Modeling of a Non-Taˆtonnement Process 21
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3. We find that an increasing
presence of general-equilibrium agents does result in higher levels of coordi-
nation. Figure 4 shows that the prices of different goods fluctuate around the
competitive equilibrium price (P∗ = 1), and that degree of deviations away
from the equilibrium decreases from few cents to nil with increasing percentage
of general-equilibrium agents. In addition, the tendency to converge appears
to be affected by λ. For example, in the case of PRE = 10%, the deviation
away from the equilibrium ranges within 5% to 10% when λ = 5, whereas it
decreases to 1% only when λ = 1.
The presence of general-equilibrium agents does not automatically ensure
that all agents adopt equilibrium prices in a meta-learning model. Their influ-
ence has a limit, even though increasing proportions of these agents do enhance
the overall tendency of the economy to remain closer to the equilibrium prices.
We shall return to this issue at the end of this section after a thorough study
of the role of the intensity of choice in the meta-learning model.
5.4 Simulation 3: Intensity of Choice and Meta-Learning
Intensity of choice (λ) has been observed to be a key parameter in determining
aggregate outcomes in heuristic switching models (Brock & Hommes, 1997;
Brock and Hommes, 1998; Hommes, 2006; Chen, Chang and Du, 2012). In
Simulation Series 3, we simulate the Scarf economy with λ ranging from 0 to
10 with an increment of 1 (Table 1). The results are presented in both Table 2
and Figure 7. We find that there is a strong tendency to coordinate for smaller
values (λ ≤ 4) and the prices stay within a three-percent neighborhood of the
equilibrium in the aggregate level (see Table 2). With an increasing λ, there is a
breakdown in the tendency to coordinate and the prices diverge away from the
equilibrium level. Figure 4 demonstrates the percentage of agents converging to
the 10% neighborhood of the Walrasian equilibrium price (WE) of Good 1 for
different values of λ.16 For lower values of intensity of choice (λ = 1, 2), we find
that the majority of agents converge. However, this coordination to the vicinity
of the equilibrium breaks down for larger values of λ. Figure 5 presents the
dynamics of mean prices of good 1 and the associated one standard deviation
value across all agents. This, again, reinforces our earlier observation that the
economy converges under meta-learning, however, only for very low values of
λ. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the mean price of good 1 across all agents
in the economy for λ = 0 (top panel) and λ = 8 (bottom panel) at different
points in time (t=1,1000 and 2000) during the simulation. In all three figures,
the data are pooled from 50 different runs of the simulation for each λ. Thus,
we find that despite the presence of meta-learning, the economy converges only
under some conditions, i.e., for lower values of intensity of choice, and fails to
do so otherwise.
A clearer picture emerges from Figure 7, where the deviations of actual
prices from the equilibrium level are related to λ and this relationship is non-
16 The behavior of the price of good 2 is qualitatively similar.
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Table 2: Prices of Goods in the Agent-Based Scarf-Economy: Aggregate and
Type-Wise
Prices Aggregate Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
λ ↓ P¯ e1 P¯ e2 P¯ e1 P¯ e2 P¯ e1 P¯ e2 P¯ e1 P¯ e2
0 0.997 0.997 0.979 1.006 1.006 0.979 1.007 1.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 0.991 0.991 0.965 1.004 1.004 0.965 1.005 1.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
2 0.979 0.978 0.934 0.999 1.000 0.933 1.004 1.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
3 0.985 0.983 0.903 1.014 1.015 0.900 1.036 1.036
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
4 1.030 1.030 0.869 1.077 1.077 0.867 1.143 1.146
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
5 1.152 1.152 0.842 1.250 1.250 0.834 1.366 1.374
(0.061) (0.061) (0.054) (0.069) (0.070) (0.051) (0.072) (0.074)
6 1.375 1.366 0.866 1.533 1.548 0.881 1.710 1.685
(0.113) (0.113) (0.089) (0.151) (0.151) (0.093) (0.125) (0.131)
7 1.455 1.462 0.843 1.632 1.629 0.840 1.893 1.914
(0.114) (0.114) (0.077) (0.131) (0.149) (0.078) (0.191) (0.170)
8 1.444 1.434 0.816 1.560 1.564 0.825 1.950 1.916
(0.122) (0.122) (0.115) (0.152) (0.146) (0.103) (0.195) (0.187)
9 1.386 1.342 0.772 1.418 1.439 0.782 1.946 1.825
(0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.133) (0.135) (0.106) (0.215) (0.258)
10 1.342 1.291 0.753 1.329 1.355 0.763 1.917 1.781
(0.112) (0.112) (0.107) (0.115) (0.115) (0.101) (0.232) (0.222)
The above table shows the mean price expectations of the whole economy (columns 2
and 3) and the mean price expectations held by each type of agent (columns 4 to 9),
under different λs. To obtain these numbers, the mean price expectations of each run
is derived first: P¯ ej,run =
∑2,500
t=2,001 P¯
e
j,run(t)/500 (j = 1, 2), then averaged over 50 runs,
P¯ ej =
∑50
run=1 P
e
j,run/50. The number inside the parentheses shown below each P¯
e
j is the
standard deviation of P ej,run, (run = 1, ..., 50).
linear. For smaller values of λ, there is a clear positive relationship between
intensity of choice and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of the price
of good 1. For λ > 5, the deviation is no longer monotonic and mean prices for
different repetitions fluctuate at around 30-45% higher than the equilibrium
level.
Although we have identified the role of intensity of choice in driving conver-
gence, we have not precisely identified the channel through which this param-
eter manifests itself. The following subsections will be devoted to addressing
this issue.
5.5 Simulation 4: Market Fractions
The Scarf economy with the meta-learning model allows us to look at the
mesoscopic structure or the market fraction by referring to the percentage
of agents who chose to be innovators (employing the social learning scheme)
and imitators (employing the individual learning scheme) on each market day.
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Fig. 4: Percentage of agents converging to Walrasian equilibrium
The above figure indicates the percentage of agents who converge to the 10% neighborhood
of the Walrasian equilibrium price (WE) of good 1 for different values of λ. The data are
pooled from 50 different runs of the agent-based Scarf economy for each value of λ. For
lower values of intensity of choice (λ = 1, 2), the majority of agents converge. However, this
coordination to the vicinity of WE breaks down for larger values of λ.
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Fig. 5: Price dynamics for good 1
The above figure presents the dynamics of the mean price of good 1 (in red) across all agents
in the economy for different values of λ. The dotted black lines denote the one standard
deviation from the mean. The data are pooled from 50 different runs for each value of λ.
The convergence of mean prices to the Walrasian equilibrium is observed for lower values of
λ and it breaks down as λ increases.
Denote this profile as
{POPail(t), POPasl(t)},
where POPail(t) and POPasl(t) are the number of innovators and imitators
on market day t, respectively. The market fraction of innovators (mksail(t))
can then be defined as the proportion of innovators in the total population.
In this paper, the term market fraction is reserved for the market fraction of
innovators.
The market fraction is not given exogenously but evolves endogenously.
By varying the micro-level parameter governing learning (more precisely, λ),
we can observe its impact on the meso and macro phenomena. We can then
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Fig. 6: Distribution of prices overtime
The above figure presents the distribution of the mean price of good 1 across all agents in
the economy for λ = 0 (top panel) and λ = 8 (bottom panel) at t=1,1000 and 2000. The
data are pooled from 50 different runs for each value of λ. The mean prices are seen to
converge to the neighborhood of the Walrasian equilibrium for a low value of λ and fail to
do so for the higher value.
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Fig. 7: Price Deviation and Intensity of Choice
The price deviation, away from the Walrasian competitive equilibrium P ∗j , is defined by
the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), which is calculated using the market price of
the last 500 market days in each single run, i.e., MAPE(Pj) =
1
500
∑2,500
t=2,001 | Pj(t)–P ∗j |
(j = 1, 2). Since we carry out 50 repetitions for each λ (λ = 1, 2, ..., 10), the 50 MAPEs
with respect to each λ are drawn from the minimum to the maximum in a box plot. The
figure above only gives the MAPE of good 1 (j = 1), which nonlinearly increases with the
intensity of choice (λ).
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Fig. 8: Market Fractions, Intensity of Choice and Price Deviations
The figure above shows the relationship between market fractions and intensity of choice
(upper panel), and the relationship between market fractions and price deviations (lower
panel). The data used here is from Simulation 3 (Section 5.4), the same data used to make
Figure 7. What are added here are the corresponding market fractions, which, as price
deviations in Figure 7, are also derived from the average of the last 500 days, i.e., mksais =
(
∑2,500
t=2,001mksais (t))/500. Since we carry out 50 repetitions for each λ, the 50 market
fractions with respect to each λ is drawn from the minimum to the maximum in the upper
panel. On the lower panel, we give the X-Y plot of the pair of the market fraction and the
MAPE in the same run by pooling together all these pairs from different λs, a total of 550
(=55 × 10) points. To enhance visibility, MAPE is shown in the logarithmic scale.
speak of the market fractions that are associated with converging and diverging
prices at the macro level.
Figure 8 shows the second part of the results of Simulation 3. We find
that there is a non-linear structure to the relationship between the market
fraction (the meso feature) and the level of price coordination (the macro phe-
nomenon). First, the relationship between intensity of choice and the resulting
market fractions is summarized in the upper panel of Figure 8. We can see that
there is an initial increase in the market fraction of innovators in an economy
as the intensity of choice increases. However, for λ > 2, this trend is reversed
and the market fraction of innovators falls and hovers around 50% for different
repetitions17. Second, concurrently, we also observe that the price deviations
are negatively related to the market fraction of innovators in an economy (see
Figure 8, the lower panel). Smaller price deviations from equilibrium levels are
associated with higher levels of innovators (70-80%). Figure 8, the lower panel,
also shows that the relation between price deviations and the percentage of
innovators reveals two broad clusters, associated with lower and higher values
of λ.
17 For λ = 0, past performance should not influence the current choice and therefore
Probt+1i;k = 1/2. Thus, we would expect the market fractions to be 50-50, in contrast to
what is observed. However, the past performance does exert an indirect influence through
the reference point mechanism. Note that the agents consider switching only when the utility
falls below their current reference point. Since innovators have relatively high pay-offs for
λ = 0 (and other lower values), the reference point mechanism introduces a bias in favor of
the innovators, which explains the deviations we observe in Fig.8.
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The inadequacy of learning from experience (innovation) alone to steer the
economy into an equilibrium and, consequently, the need for imitation has
been pointed out by Gintis (2007). In Simulation Series 1, we have already
established that an economy with only innovators or imitators cannot facili-
tate price coordination to equilibrium levels. We extend this observation by
asking whether a combination of innovators or imitators can help explain co-
ordination to the Walrasian equilibrium. Given that high levels of innovators
are associated with a tendency for convergent prices under meta-learning, we
cannot help but wonder whether market fractions drive price convergence or
whether the market fraction alone is sufficient to explain price coordination
to equilibrium. If this were to be true, then we can make a case for ignoring
the micro-level characteristics and focus on the meso structure of the economy
alone. This can be formulated more precisely as the ‘market fraction hypothe-
sis’: an exogenously given market fraction (a linear combination of innovators
and imitators) would be sufficient to ensure price coordination in the agent-
based Scarf economy.
Note that the market fractions of innovators for λ = 1 and λ = 3 are
comparable, but their price divergence metrics (MAPE) in 7 are not identi-
cal, and instead show an increasing pattern. To test this more rigorously, we
simulate the economy where agents have fixed schemes of learning that are
preassigned to them. There is no meta-learning and the market fraction of
innovators and imitators in an economy is exogenously fixed. This proportion
and the set of agents who innovate (or imitate) remains unchanged for the rest
of the simulation. This design will enable us to test the validity of the market
fraction hypothesis. Simulation Series 4 experiments with different combina-
tions of exogenously given market fractions. Figure 9 reports the result for the
case where the fraction is fixed at 70%-30% (the left panel) and 75%-25% (the
right panel), the levels corresponding to the instances where convergence was
observed in the meta-learning model (see Figure 8, the lower panel). We ran
fifty repetitions for each experimental setting and the mean aggregate prices
for the final 500 periods are averaged across repetitions. We find that the prices
explode (unlike for the meta-learning model) when the market fractions are
fixed exogenously (see Figure 9). Even for other alternative fixed combinations
(30-70, 50-50, etc.), prices do not converge to the Walrasian equilibrium prices.
To understand the underlying mechanism, notice that there are two distinct
effects: the stabilizing effect exerted by the imitators and the explosive effect
of the pure innovators. The group of imitators among themselves will converge
to the initial price held by the agent who is closest to the equilibrium price
(simulation 1B). However, the innovators will contribute to the explosive price
dynamics for reasons explained in simulation 1A. Under any fixed combina-
tion, the combined effect will result in non-convergence because the explosive
effect of innovators will overpower the stabilizing effect of imitators on the
average prices in the economy. This is due to the absence of the information
exchange needed for coordination under a fixed linear combination set-up.
Hence, we can conclude that meso-level observations alone cannot explain the
coordination process.
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Fig. 9: Price Dynamics of Exogenously-Setting Market Fractions
The above two panels show the price dynamics of 50 repetitions under two fixed market
fractions, namely, 70% (the left panel) and 75% (the right panel). In these simulations,
70% (75%) of agents are assumed to be innovators not just initially, but remain innovators
throughout the entire duration of the simulation, and similarly for the rest of the agents,
who are assumed to be imitators and continue to behave in that way.
5.6 Simulation 5: Path Dependence of the Market Fraction
Section 5.5 shows that the exogenously given (fixed) market fraction alone
cannot ensure that the market will coordinate itself at the Walrasian compet-
itive equilibrium; hence, the competitive equilibrium has to be understood as
an outcome co-emerging with the market fraction endogenously determined
by intensity of choice (λ). However, in addition to λ, coordination can also de-
pend on the initial distribution of the market fractions, mksail(0). We examine
whether the dynamics of the market fractions is path-dependent in Simulation
Series 5.18 To provide a better motivation, Figure 10 demonstrates the results
of a slice of Simulation 5, i.e., one single run of the agent-based Scarf economy
under different initial market fractions (mksail(0)) with respect to the same
set of λs used in Simulation 3.
Figure 10 shows the time series plots of the market fractions under different
settings. The six boxes, from the upper left to the bottom right, demonstrate
the results for different values of λ indicated on top. Within each box, the
five series correspond to five different initial values (mksail(0)) as indicated in
Figure 10. Regardless of their initial value, the prices tend to evolve toward
a narrow corridor. Notice that they all begin with a wider range from 0.1 to
0.9, but end up with a narrower range, a range from 0.1 to 0.25. Hence, in this
sense, there is a converging force working to weaken the effect of the initial
conditions to some degree.
Nevertheless, depending on the λ, we also see some fundamental differences
among the cases with smaller λs (λ ≤ 4) and those with larger λs (λ > 4).
First, the exact location of the formed corridor depends on λ. For the case
with smaller λs, the centroids of the corridors seem to have a tendency to move
18 At this point, mksail (0) is evenly distributed over two different learning schemes (Table
1).
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Fig. 10: Time Series of Market Fractions
In the figure above, each box corresponds to a specific λ indicated. Inside each box, there are
five time series of market fractions, corresponding to five different initial market fractions
(mksail (0)=0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9). Each of the plot of mksail (t) is based on a single
run of the agent-based Scarf economy.
toward a value substantially larger than 0.5, indicating a majority of innovators
(agents following the individual learning scheme), whereas for the cases with
larger λs, the centroids of the corridors remain at a level generally around 0.5,
indicating that innovators and imitators are equally populated (to be discussed
further in Table 3). Second, in addition to different levels of centroids, we also
notice the differences in the volatility of the market fraction. For the cases
with smaller λs, the higher centroid is accompanied by a larger fluctuation
of market fractions, implying a high turnover rate in between innovators and
imitators. On the other hand, for the cases with larger λs, the market fraction
is rather steady, which might suggest a lower turnover rate in between two
types of agents. We examine this further in Section 5.8.
To show that the results are not just limited to a single run, in Simulation 5
we conduct 50 runs with the following five market fractions: mksail(0)=0, 0.25,
0.50, 0.75, and 1.00. The results are shown in Table 3 in the Appendix B. In
Table 3 we present the mean of the market fractions, and the mean is taken over
the last 500 market days. In addition, the volatility of the series is indicated in
the parentheses in the form of the standard deviation. From this, we can see
that the table can be divided into two parts by λ, namely, λ ≤ 4 vs. λ ≥ 4, and
the three salient features revealed in Figure 10 are sustained. First of all, λ can
determine who the majority is. When λ is small, innovators globally dominate,
but when λ is large innovators dominate only if they dominate in the initial
period. Second, from the value inside the parentheses, λ can also determine the
degree of variability of the market fraction. The degree of variability is high
when λ is small, and it is low when λ is large. Finally, the effect of the initial
condition is substantially weakened. It is particularly so for small λs, where
the mean effect is independent of the initial market fraction; nevertheless, path
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dependence does exist for large λs, where the mean fraction increases with the
initial fraction.
5.7 Payoff Inequality
Up to this point, we can see that the key parameter in the meta-learning
model, λ, has a quite extensive effect on the decentralized market economy,
from the price deviations and market fractions. This is not surprising since
if decentralization implies a search in terms of exploration and exploitation,
then a parameter characterizing the allocation of the resources to these two
fundamental economic activities should be critical.
Presumably, we may expect that a good value of λ would allow for a bal-
anced search in a way that the payoffs for various learning schemes are es-
sentially equivalent. If one search scheme (learning scheme), say, exploitation
(individual learning), is more efficient, the resources will be reallocated to it
from exploration (social learning) and vice versa and, in the end, the payoffs
for the two schemes will be equivalent. Hence, we ask: would the market frac-
tion be determined in a way that, regardless of its final level, both learning
schemes are rewarded with the same payoffs? Or, alternatively, would the pay-
offs (economic gains) be equally distributed to innovators and imitators within
the society?19
To answer this question, we retrieve the data generated from Simulation 3,
and examine the impact of λ on the payoff equality or inequality. The results
are shown in Figure 11. From the figure, we find little evidence supporting
the equality of the payoffs, not even averaged over time, with the case where
λ = 4 being an exception. In other cases, a payoff gap between innovators
and imitators is persistent throughout the entire simulation. After a point,
the width of the gap remains constant; it neither increases nor decreases. The
only feature that distinguishes the nine boxes in Figure 11 is again λ. When
λ is small (λ ≤ 3), the payoff to the innovators is larger than the payoff to the
imitators. However, there is a slight tendency for the gap to shrink with the
increase in λ and then the inequality relation reverses when λ is large (λ > 4)
and the gap widens again with a further increase in λ. The gap becomes
particularly wide when λ is as high as 7 or 8, at which point the payoff to the
imitators is four times higher that the payoff to the innovators.
By combining these results together with the ones in Section 5.6, we make
the following observations: the payoff differential only weakly determines who
the majority is. When λ ≤ 3, the payoff to the innovators is higher, and the
innovators are the majority, whereas when λ ≥ 4, the payoff to the imitators
is higher, but the innovators still marginally dominates till λ goes beyond 7.
19 So far, we have not seen many empirical studies directly devoted to examining the
payoff distribution among different heuristics, schemes or strategies in the context of adap-
tive belief systems or heuristic switching models, neither from the simulation studies, nor
from the experimental studies. In this regard, the only study close to us is Bossan, Jann,
and Hammerstein (2015), but their adjustment is made at the mesoscopic level (a kind of
replicator dynamics), and not at a microscopic level.
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Fig. 11: Payoff Inequality between Innovators and Imitators
The figure is based on the data retrieved from Simulation 3. Each of the boxes above
shows the time series of the mean payoffs to innovators and imitators. Each point at
time t is calculated as follows. We first figure out the mean of each run: U¯il(t) =
(
∑
i∈Ail(t) Ui(t))/POPail (t), and U¯sl(t) = (
∑
i∈Asl(t) Ui(t))/POPasl (t), where Ail(t)
(Asl(t)) is the set of agents who applied the individual (social) learning scheme at time
t, i.e., the set of innovators (imitators). We then take the mean of these means over 50 runs.
The blue line indicates the payoffs to innovators, and the red line indicates the payoffs to
imitators. The nine boxes above from the left to the right, and from the upper to the lower
levels, correspond to the case λ=0, 1, 2, ...,8.
Except when λ = 4, there is no instance when λ can deliver equal pay-
offs.20 One may wonder why the differences in payoffs can persistently exist.
A reasonable conjecture is that, when λ is large, agents have already stopped
switching from one scheme to the other scheme due to the power law of prac-
tice (see Section 5.8 for the details).21 This is particularly so since in our
simulation the recency parameter, φ is set to be zero (Table 1), i.e., no for-
getting. Hence, some initial good experiences with a given scheme will lock in
the agent’s choice of it. However, the puzzle remains for the small λs. Do we
also expect a similar hysteresis effect there? We shall take a closer look at this
issue in Section 5.8.
20 We are not able to show here the λ which can serve as the equalizer. However, since the
payoff reversal happens when λ increases from 3 to 4, we suspect that there may exist some
λs (λ ∈ (3, 5)) which may remove the gap.
21 In the psychology literature, the power law of practice indicates that subjects’ early
learning experiences have a dominating effect in their limiting behavior; it is normally char-
acterized by initially steep but then flatter learning curves. In the machine learning litera-
ture, it is also known as premature convergence, and is a familiar result corresponding to
the path-dependence property of learning dynamics. In our case, when agents’ memory never
decays (φ = 0) and λ is large, say, λ = 10, the path dependency effect can become extreme.
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5.8 Mobile Agents
What we have learned up to this stage is that λ not only matters for the
determination of price deviations and market fractions (the majority and the
minority), but it also matters for the payoffs for different type of agents (the
majority and the minority). What is not clear is why the gap in the payoffs
among different types of agents can persist simultaneously with rather stable
market fractions, specifically for the case where λ ≥ 5 (Figures 10 and 11).
Why doesn’t the market fraction respond to this gap? On the other hand, it is
equally puzzling that even though we see that the market fraction fluctuates
over time it has little impact on the gap persistence, specifically for the case
where λ ≤ 3 (Figures 10 and 11). To address these questions, we go further
down from the mesoscopic level to a microscopic level.
The questions raised above can be partially answered as follows. The pro-
vision of two learning schemes or meta learning is only superficial, since some
agents never or rarely consider the alternative. In other words, they are rather
immobile or nearly immobile. Their prevalence can explain the persistent co-
existence of the payoff gap with a stable market fraction. However, we cannot
infer the degree of immobility directly from the market fraction statistics. To
see this, consider the configuration that half of the agents are innovators and
the other half are imitators. In one case, neither of these halves switches to the
other scheme, but, in the other case, the same two halves constantly switch at
each turn of the market days. In both cases, the market fraction is constantly
50%, but the former implies zero mobility, whereas the latter implies perfect
mobility. This simple example shows that Figure 10 can shed little light on
agents’ mobility. To prove that our conjecture is correct, we therefore need
more direct evidence.
The direct evidence can be obtained by tracing the percentage of agents
who are immobile in each run. Of course, from a technical viewpoint, unless
the probability of switching becomes identically zero (Equation 16), agents
will almost surely switch as long as the simulation duration is long enough.
Hence, pragmatically speaking, the term ‘mobile (immobile) agent’ is just a
matter of degree, and in this paper we set a minimum threshold, fmin, by
which agents are termed mobile agents if their number of switches during the
entire course of simulation, fi, is greater than this threshold (fi > fmin), and
are termed near-immobile agents, or, simply, immobile agents if fi ≤ fmin.
Figure 12, the left panel, shows the number of immobile agents when fmin
is set to 1, i.e., an agent will be considered to be an immobile agent if during
the entire course of the simulation he has switched at most once. The results
reported are the box-and-whisker plot of the 50 repetitions. This figure clearly
shows that the number of immobile agents increases with λ. For example,
when λ = 10, from Figure 12 (left panel), 25% to 50% of the agents are
nearly immobile. By contrast, when λ is low almost all agents are mobile.
Basically, what is revealed here is that even though our meta-learning model
allows agents to switch in between innovators or imitators, this flexibility is
gone with a large λ. The parameter λ can actually force a large proportion of
32 Shu-Heng Chen et al.
Intensity of Choice
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
um
be
r o
f A
ge
nt
s
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Near-Immobile Agents (t=2,500)
Intensity of Choice
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Av
er
ag
e 
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
wi
tc
he
s
0
5
10
15
20
25
Fig. 12: Near-Immobile Agents and Switching Frequencies
The left panel shows the number of immobile agents with respect to different values of λ.
The immobile agent is defined using a switching threshold fmin = 1. The number shown
here is the box-and-whisker plot of the 50 repetitions. The right panel of the figure shows the
number of the switches happening on a single market day. A single switch on market day t is
observed if an innovator (imitator) at time t−1 decides to become an imitator (innovator) at
time t. Let Mo(t) be the number of switches observed on market day t. Let Mo be the mean
taken over the entire course of the simulation, i.e., Mo = (
∑2,500
t=1 Mo(t))/2, 500. What is
drawn in the right panel is the box-whisker plot of these Mos from 50 runs under each given
λ.
agents to effectively choose to either just be innovators or just be imitators,
and then never switch or rarely switch (fmin = 1).
It is worth mentioning that fmin = 1 is a very low threshold; the degree
of immobility defined accordingly is very conservative. To get a feeling of how
immobile these high-λ societies can be, in the right panel of Figure 12 we
provide another measure based on the number of switches observed on each
market day. As we can see from this panel, the number of switches is almost
zero when λ is large. Hence, around 50% of the population only exploits (Table
3), and even though they are moving in the wrong direction, they would not
be aware of this or correct their mistakes by learning from others. We can call
this a ‘Type-I error’. Similarly, around 50% of the population only explores;
even though they copy and help distribute wrong beliefs, they never question
the validity of these ‘public opinions’. We can call this a ‘Type-II error’.
The aggregation of these two types of errors reaches its maximum when we
have a perfect ‘segregation’ society, i.e., the high-λ society, of which agents are
either innovators or imitators but rarely switch.22 This explains the earlier ob-
served relationship between price deviation and λ. In fact, a further statistical
analysis shows that the correlation coefficient between the number of switches
and price deviations (MAPE) is -0.628.23
On the other hand, if we look at the low-λ societies, almost all agents will
reasonably switch in between the two schemes and hence their exploitations are
22 As we show in Appendix C, the inferior performance is mainly contributed by innovators
rather than imitators.
23 The correlation is based on the pool of 550 pairs of the MAPE (of good 1) and the
average number of switches (over the last 500 periods). There are 550 pairs because we have
50 repetitions for 11 λs.
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corrected by explorations and their explorations are checked by exploitations.
The results show that when we have roughly 7% (20 out of 270) of the agents
who are able to switch per market day, the price deviations are confined to a
range of 1% around the equilibrium in the aggregate and within the 5% range
for each type (see Table 2).
The microscopic analysis confirms that λ, through its effect on the ex-
ploration and exploitation behavior of each agent, can impact the genera-
tion and distribution of ‘knowledge’, in light of what Hayek has emphasized
as the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place (Hayek
(1945), p. 521). The market mechanism, in terms of its information aggre-
gation and processing mechanism, can then be substantially different if the
ways in which knowledge that is generated and distributed are fundamentally
different, caused by the presence of a high percentage of mobile or immobile
agents.
In Appendix C, we analyze the relative importance of these two types of
errors at the individual level by examining the payoffs to these two types of
agents who may contribute to these errors. We find that the market mechanism
is a joint function of exploration and exploitation. They help each other, but
when one function is not working, exploitation alone can do more harm than
exploration alone. This echoes what we have observed in Section 5.2. The
reason why exploitation can do more harm than exploration alone is probably
because it results in a lower spread of information and hence prevents markets
from pooling information effectively.
6 Concluding Remarks
The challenge of Walrasian non-taˆtonnement analysis lies in its potentially
very large commodity space, which inevitably introduces the dimensionality
curse for many modern tools in computational behavioral economics, such as
artificial neural nets and evolutionary computation (Chen, Kao and Ragupa-
thy, 2016). Nevertheless, models of learning and adaptation are indispensable
in Walrasian non-taˆtonnement dynamics. Gintis (2007) had proposed the com-
bined use of individual learning and social learning, both in its simplest form,
as an effective recipe. In this paper, we have proposed a meta-learning model to
combine both learning schemes into a behaviorally more intuitive framework.
In our meta-learning model, λ (the intensity of choice) turns out to be a
key parameter. When λ is low, the Walrasian competitive equilibrium is sta-
ble even in the famous Scarf counterexample (Scarf, 1960). The patterns and
behavior in economies with a low λ are in stark contrast to those with a high-
λ. The difference between these two economies can be understood through
their differences in resource allocation between exploration and exploitation
as manifested by their market fractions and the agents’ mobility. We show
that a society composed of mobile agents, who frequently switch between the
two learning schemes (innovators and imitators) is crucial for price discovery
and the convergence to the competitive equilibrium. We also show that price
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discovery is achieved through a kind of balance between exploration and ex-
ploitation, which concretizes Hayek’s ‘use of knowledge in the society’ (Hayek,
1945).24 It also focuses on the psychological factors underpinning market out-
comes. It is important to note that, in general, there is no price mechanism to
coordinate exploration and exploitation.
Although we work with a simple model, many of the features of the present
model can be easily generalized (the utility functions, for instance) and addi-
tional structures concerning production, technological change and institutions
can be introduced. This can help us to understand the dynamics at a de-
centralized level and can empower us to perform structured computational
experiments in complex environments, where the dynamics does not always
yield itself to neat, closed-form solutions.
A Implementation details
The details regarding the implementation of the simulations are provided in this appendix.
All simulations and analyses were performed using NetLogo 5.2.0 and Matlab R2015a. The
NetLogo interface of our simulations is provided in Figure 13. To comply with the current
community norm, we have made the computer program available at the OPEN ABM.25
Figure 13 is the typical NetLogo operation interface. We classify the figure into two blocks.
The first block (the left most block) is a list of control bars for users to supply the values
of the control parameters to run the simulation. The parameters are detailed in Table 1,
including N , M , S, T , ϕ, θ1, θ2, K, λ, POPRE (defined in Section 5.3), and POPail (0).
In addition to these variables, other control bars are the on-off choices for the running
model, including individual learning (only), social learning (only), an exogenously given
market fraction, and the meta-learning model. For the exogenously given market fraction,
POPail (0) needs to be given additionally.
On the left of the control panels are the real-time demonstrations of the economy under
operation. The six subfigures shown in the upper right block are information related to
price expectations sustained for a trading day (3) and excess demand and supply settled at
the end of a trading day(10). The results are plotted in a time series. The leftmost three
subfigures refer to the mean of price expectations (by good and by type), and the middle
three subfigures refer to the mean of excess demand and supply (by good and by type).
The top leftmost three subfigures give the summary of the market: prices, quantities,
and market fraction (population of innovators). The first one gives the time series plot of the
mean of the actual trading prices of goods 1 and 2, denoted by M1 t and M2 t in contrast
to its expectations averaged over all agents, M1 and M2 (good 3 serves as the nume´raire).
The middle one gives the time series of aggregate demand, summed over all agents’ planned
demand (4). The third one gives the time series of the fraction of agents who adopt the
individual learning scheme.
Immediately below the above nine subfigures is the snapshot distribution (dispersion) of
price expectations, displayed by goods. The histogram of good 3 is trivial because it serves
as the nume´raire. The last two subfigures at the bottom provide the information on the
relative price of each pair of goods. On the left is the time series of the mean relative price
of each pair of goods and on the right is the time series of the respective standard deviation
(price dispersion).
24 See Chen and Venkatachalam (2017) for limits to information aggregation and price
discovery in a related context.
25 https://www.openabm.org/model/4897/
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Fig. 13: NetLogo interface for the simulation of the agent-based Scarf Economy
B Endogenously Determined Market Fractions
This appendix provides the table describing the simulation results concerning endogenously
generated market fractions starting from different initial conditions.
Table 3: Endogenously Determined Market Fractions
IIR ↓ / λ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 0.684 0.764 0.826 0.764 0.651 0.571 0.515 0.465 0.419 0.377 0.339
(0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
0.25 0.685 0.764 0.826 0.769 0.658 0.576 0.523 0.472 0.440 0.420 0.384
(0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
0.5 0.685 0.763 0.827 0.775 0.672 0.598 0.551 0.517 0.489 0.470 0.459
(0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.75 0.685 0.764 0.830 0.781 0.692 0.634 0.594 0.571 0.551 0.546 0.546
(0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
1 0.685 0.764 0.832 0.794 0.719 0.677 0.648 0.633 0.630 0.635 0.633
(0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Each cell in the table above corresponds to one parameter value of the initial market
fraction (IIR), ranging from 0 to 1 with an increment of .25 as shown in the leading
column, and one parameter value of λ, ranging from 0 to 10 with an increment of 1 as
shown in the leading row. In each pair of the two parameter values, (IIR, λ), we simulate
the Scarf economy for 50 repetitions, each with a duration of 2,500 days. The mean market
fraction of a single repetition is then first derived by taking the average over the last 500
days of each run, i.e., mksail = (
∑2,500
t=2,001mksail (t))/500, and then the number reported
in each cell of the table is the average of these 50 mksails obtained from the 50 repetitions.
As usual, the standard deviation of the series is shown inside the parentheses.
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C Payoff Inequality and Two Types of Errors
In Section 5.8, we have seen that large populations of immobile agents associated with large
λs cause the market mechanism to malfunction due to both the possible presence of ‘type-I’
and ‘type-II’ errors. In this section, we shall have a further look at the relative importance
of these two types of errors at the individual level by examining the payoffs to these two
types of agents who may contribute to these errors. In Figure 14, we present the results
in parallel to Figure 11 except that here we only restrict our attention to those innovators
and imitators who are immobile. Since there is only a negligible number of immobile agents
when λ < 5 (Figure 12, the left panel), we only report the payoffs of these two groups for
λ ≥ 5 in Figure 14.
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Fig. 14: Payoffs to Immobile Agents: Innovators or Imitators
The figure is based on the data retrieved from Simulation 3. Each of the boxes above shows
the time series of the mean payoffs to immobile innovators and immobile imitators. The
immobile agent is defined by the given threshold fmin. Each point at time t is calculated
as follows. We first figure out the mean of each run: U¯fil(t) = (
∑
i∈Af
il
Ui(t))/#A
f
il, and
U¯fsl(t) = (
∑
i∈Af
sl
Ui(t))/#A
f
sl, where A
f
il (A
f
sl) is the set of immobile innovators (imitators).
We then take the mean of these means over 50 runs. The blue line indicates the payoffs to
immobile innovators, and the red line indicates the payoffs to immobile imitators. The six
boxes above, from the left to the right, from the upper to the lower levels, correspond to the
case of λ=5, 6,. . . ,10. Notice that the first subplot (λ=5) does not have immobile imitators,
and hence the red line is not available. As expected, when the sample size (the population
size of the immobile agents) is rather small, we experience a variability in the results, for
example, when λ = 6, 7.
As in Figure 11, Figure 14 shows that, even for the immobile agents, the imitators’
performance is superior to that of the innovators. In fact, these two figures together show that
the payoffs to innovators drop substantially with an increase in immobile agents, whereas
the payoffs to imitators are not affected substantially by the prevalence of immobile agents.
Therefore, despite our taxonomy of two types of errors, what contributes to the ‘malfunction’
of the market mechanism the most is the ‘type-one error’. This result demonstrates that
the market mechanism is a joint function of exploration and exploitation. They help each
other, but when one function is not working, exploitation alone can do more harm than
exploration alone.
The above finding resonates well with what we have observed in Section 5.2, in which
one economy has only exploitation (Section 5.2.1) and one economy has only exploration
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(Section 5.2.2). The reason why exploitation can do more harm than exploration alone is
probably because it results in a lower spread of information and hence prevents markets
from pooling information effectively. Nevertheless, we have also seen that the performance
of innovators (exploitation) can be generally beefed up when learning from others is possible,
i.e., being mobile agents. Indeed, when the market is filled with mobile agents (the case with
low λs), innovators on average perform better than imitators, as shown in Figure 11 (the
sub-figures with small λs).
The above results also shed light on our earlier result that the presence of general-
equilibirum agents does not automatically ensure that all agents will adopt equilibrium
prices in our meta-learning model (Section 5.3). Why do these ‘superior’ price expectations
fail to spread across the whole economy? The reason is due to the existence of immobile
agents who not only block themselves away from the adoption of the ‘superior’ belief, but
may generate lots of ‘noises’ to prevent others from copying it.
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